Introduction to Venezuela’s Oil Crisis
Speculation about President Nicolas Maduro’s political future has increased after US forces seized a Venezuelan oil tanker off the country’s coast. Wednesday’s incident underscores Washington’s longstanding interest in a country that has the largest proven oil reserves in the world – an interest that China shares, albeit for different reasons.
China’s Stance on Venezuela
“Whoever comes to power, I can assure you, the first call will be Trump, but the second call will be Xi Jinping,” said Parsifal D’Sola Alvarado, a specialist on China-Latin America relations. D’Sola Alvarado directs the Fundacion Andres Bello (Latin American-Chinese Research Center) based in Bogota, Colombia and the Spanish capital Madrid. He previously worked with Venezuelan opposition figure Juan Guaido, where he maintained contacts with Chinese officials.
Beijing’s Limited Support
Speaking to DW, D’Sola Alvarado said he doubted China would stand firmly behind Maduro in the event of a confrontation with Washington. Beyond diplomatic and political support, he believes it is "highly unlikely that China will offer Maduro more proactive support through arms sales or major new investments. China does not want any more problems with the US."
Venezuela’s Oil Exports
China still buys most of Venezuela’s oil. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2023, nearly two-thirds of Venezuela’s crude oil exports went to China, while 23% went to the United States. Before Washington imposed far-reaching sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA in 2019 – after blocking its access to US financial markets in 2017 – the USA was the country’s largest customer. Production and exports collapsed soon after.
OPEC Data
OPEC data shows Venezuela’s crude oil exports fell to just under 500,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2021, continuing a decline that long predated the sanctions. Production peaked at nearly 2 million bpd in 2015 before steadily declining due to years of mismanagement, corruption and chronic underinvestment.
Chevron’s Role in Venezuela’s Oil Production
It was only in 2023 that production began to recover, with exports rising to 655,000 bpd in 2024 and reaching 921,000 bpd in November this year. Much of the recovery is due to the United States, not China. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Washington eased some restrictions on Venezuela, with the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control granting special licenses to U.S. oil giant Chevron to resume exports from its Venezuelan joint ventures. In October 2025, the company again received approval to produce oil there.
Chevron’s Impact
"The recovery in oil production in Venezuela is thanks to Chevron," Francisco J. Monaldi, an energy policy specialist at the Baker Institute at Rice University in Houston, Texas, told DW. Chevron now accounts for almost a quarter of Venezuela’s total production.
China’s Dwindling Footprint
While Chevron is expanding, Chinese investments are limited to smaller projects. China Concord Resources Corp. has reportedly begun developing two oil fields. An investment of around $1 billion is planned to increase production to 60,000 bpd by the end of 2026. But Beijing’s state-backed development lenders such as the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China have effectively closed their wallets by not issuing new loans to Caracas since 2016.
Limited Economic Consequences
Much of Venezuela’s roughly $60 billion in debt to China has been reduced through restructuring and oil-for-credit deals. Combined with the lack of new loans, scaled-back diplomacy and quiet outreach to the Venezuelan opposition, D’Sola Alvarado sees unmistakable signs that Beijing "does not fully support Maduro." He points out that China was already frustrated in 2011 when $8 billion of Chinese money from the China-Venezuelan Investment Fund “simply disappeared.”
A Change with Limits
He argues that US sanctions are not the main reason for China’s withdrawal, but "just another nail in the coffin" of bilateral relations. Even if power changes hands in Caracas, China will suffer only limited economic consequences and no “major losses,” according to D’Sola Alvarado. However, the larger shift would be geopolitical, as Beijing would no longer have direct access to the Venezuelan government and its networks. “So it’s always worth having a foot for the Chinese,” he added.
