قانون التجسس في العراق: نصوص معلقة
الINTRODUCTION
Since 2003, Iraq has become a stage for international and regional influence, where external powers’ interests have intertwined with those of domestic parties, security has intersected with politics, and local loyalties have become entangled with international calculations.
THE LAKE OF COMPLEXITY
This scene is not just a reflection of the power struggles of major powers, but has become an integral part of the Iraqi political system itself, where government positions and sensitive security roles have been transformed into tools in the hands of entities with external connections, direct or indirect.
THE QUESTION RAISED
In this context, the big question is: Why has the Iraqi intelligence agency not opened files on individuals with external loyalties? Is it due to the lack of information, or is the agency itself bound by political and sectarian consensus? And if the Iraqi law criminalizes collaboration with foreign entities, why are not these provisions applied to prominent figures with clear links to regional and international powers?
THE LAW OF ESPIONAGE IN IRAQ: UNCLEAR PROVISIONS
In all sovereign countries, espionage is a crime that is punished by law, whether through providing intelligence information to another country or implementing political agendas for the benefit of foreign powers. Iraq is no exception, where Law No. 111 of 1969 criminalizes any unprincipled collaboration with foreign entities that poses a threat to national security.
THE PROBLEM IS NOT LACK OF LAWS, BUT LACK OF POLITICAL WILL
But the problem is not the lack of laws, but the lack of political will to enforce them. Since 2003, the Iraqi scene has been characterized by complex balances between political parties and regional powers, making it nearly impossible to apply these laws, especially when it comes to prominent figures with clear links to international powers.
THE "STATE OF DENIAL"
In this sea of complexities, it seems that there is no real possibility of opening files on individuals with external loyalties. The interests are too intertwined, the alliances too strong, and the protection too great for any attempt to open such files to be successful.
THE "STATE OF DENIAL" CONTINUES
The Iraqi state continues to face significant challenges in achieving its political and security sovereignty, amidst the infiltration of foreign influence in state institutions. As long as the political will to enforce the laws is absent, this issue will remain just a "media topic" without any practical steps, perpetuating the "state of denial" that has characterized Iraqi politics since 2003.
CONCLUSION
In the end, the question remains: Can Iraq ever regain its full sovereignty, free from external influence, or has this interference become an integral part of its political fabric? The answer is uncertain, but one thing is clear: the "state of denial" will continue to dominate the Iraqi political scene.
